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Brien Williams:
This is an oral history interview for George J. Mitchell Oral History
Project at Bowdoin College with former Senator Dennis DeConcini. We’re in the Washington,
D.C., offices of the government relations firm Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms. Today is
Wednesday, September 16, 2009, and I am Brien Williams. I thought we’d start about the class
of ‘76, when you were voted into the Senate. That was a year of big changeover in the Senate.
Dennis DeConcini:

It was.

BW: And a group of you, new blood, came in. Did you see yourselves as a cohesive group, or
were you all just very individualistic?
DC: Well, when you first come into the Senate, my experience is that you’re overwhelmed,
unless you have been in Congress and you know the Capitol. I didn’t, I’d been a prosecutor, a
district attorney, and [I also] worked for a governor in Arizona, so [the U.S. Senate] was a little
overwhelming. [ ] The seniority system [ ] puts you in your place right away, which is fine. So
[the group I came in with] was only cohesive in the sense that there was a senator, Senator
Melcher from Montana, who’d come over from the House [and] immediately put together a
coalition of western senators, and I ended up chairing that [coalition] with Paul Laxalt my second
year here, and that made it cohesive.
But to answer your question, from the standpoint of dealing with the other side of the aisle, it
was so much easier then. I attributed some of that to the fact that I came from a western state
and Barry Goldwater was my colleague there, and Arizona was just moving towards a
Republican majority, I got elected about the last time there was a slight majority of Democrats
elected, next two times it was a majority of Republicans, so we had a lot more in common with
western senators.
But having said that, we had Alan Cranston from California, one of the most liberal senators, and
we could work on Western issues. So there was a lot more camaraderie, it seemed to me, than
there is today. And I verify that through my friend, I just saw at breakfast today, Orrin Hatch,
I’ve talked to him so many times, we came into the [Senate at the] same time, and we [both
believe] [p/o] that it’s changed, and it has changed for the worse, in his opinion. [p/o]
So when [I] came [to the Senate], people really went out of their way to be friendly. Bennett
Johnston, for instance, from Louisiana, was the chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee.
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They didn’t give me hardly any money because they didn’t think I had a chance, but when I
came here, nobody could have been nicer to me than Bennett Johnston, and he apologized,
kiddingly, he said, “God, I didn’t think you were going win, or I would have dumped some
money in there,” and that’s the way it was. So it was friendly that way.
And then the other thing [ ] that was so beneficial to me [was] the man that Barry Goldwater beat
in 1952 , [ ] a guy named Ernest McFarland, who was the majority leader [and] very close to
what they call the ‘old bulls’ here, Eastland and Talmadge and those old fellows that ran the
place. There was Russell Long and [Howard] Baker and [Bob] Dole and all the [famous ones].
So he [i.e. Sen. McFarland] called all those Democrats that he knew very well ([he] used to play
poker with them and drink with them), and told them, he says, because he was a very dear friend
of my father, my father had been his campaign chairman and he was of course my acting, the
figurehead campaign chairman, and he called them up and said, hey, Jim Eastland told me this
story, so did Stennis, he says, “This is Mac, [ ] now you got a funny sounding name coming up
there from Arizona, you treat him right.” And they told me that, because I went around and
introduced myself to all the so-called senior guys, and so many of them told me that, that helped
me a lot to break the ice.
But overall, to make – and I don’t want to take too long to answer your question – it was a
different environment, at least in my observation.
(an aside)
BW: Good. ‘76, the Democratic Party still had shades of McGovern ‘72 in it, moving maybe
a little bit in a different direction. Where did you place yourself in your campaign as you came
to Congress?
DC: I ran the same time Jimmy Carter ran, and I was not getting close to Jimmy Carter. Even
though he was a reformist, he was for some gun restrictions [p/o], and the big change he was
making and talking about health care and stuff, and I came from a conservative state and I never
was able to support wholeheartedly the Democratic platform, [p/o] even when my good friend
Walter Mondale was running, I just didn’t support the platform, I supported the Democrats.
So I ran as an independent Democrat, and that’s how Democrats got elected there, with probably
the exception of Morris Udall, who came from the southern part of the state where I came from
(which was a more liberal community, or more moderate community). But Arizona was very,
very conservative, but they were Independent conservatives, they would switch over. The
governor that I worked for was a Democrat, and then they [elected a Democrat], and then they
put a Democrat back in, and that’s the way they kind of do it in Arizona.
BW: So who were similar Democrats in the Senate when you arrived, did you have buddies,
politically speaking?
DC:

Yes, there was several. One turned out to be Bennett Johnston, he was already here, and
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Sam Nunn, two people that I gravitated to, it so happened we just found out we had been in the
same fraternity in college; [that] didn’t have anything to do with it, but it just so happened that
way. And then as other members came in, Jim Exon and [others] that [were] more in the middle
of the road, that’s where I gravitated to. Orrin Hatch and I sat next to each other and Malcolm
Wallop, we were the last three guys in the back row, and we became friends and we all sat on the
Judiciary Committee.
And Bob Dole sat on the Judiciary Committee, and he immediately, he’s such a bright guy, he
immediately could tell I was more of a centrist, and we had Metzenbaum and Abourezk and
Culver and Kennedy—and then we had Jim Eastland, who was the chairman. So Dole went out
of his way to extend friendship to me. He was [the] minority leader, boy I’m really impressed,
and I don’t begrudge him for that, but we worked on a lot of bills [ ].
And at the same time, the more liberal members, such as Ted Kennedy and maybe Dale Bumpers
and Ribicoff and some of the ones in the northeast, they couldn’t have been nicer to me, and I’m
just a little guy coming from Arizona. Even though the seniority system placed where you’re
going to sit all the time, it just wasn’t that way, it was the most friendly thing. The first CODEL
I went on, Abe Ribicoff led [it, and] there were twelve of us, senators, my wife and I were the
[least senior] ones, and they treated me [very nice] - Except I sat in the back of the plane; so
what?
BW:

Where did you go?

DC: Well, we went to the Soviet Union then, and I was a big supporter of the Refuseniks
because of the many Jewish contacts I had in Arizona, and I had worked hard on that issue and
so I went there. And under the Carter administration they discouraged us [from] going out and
meeting with these Refuseniks, because they were working whatever they were working way
above my grade, and I was the only one that went out. I took a staffer with me, and we found
these Refuseniks [p/o], we went to see them, and Dr. Lerner was one of the famous ones that [I
met with] —I went to his flat. And we’d go outside and walk so they wouldn’t be bugged,
because some of them had been in jail and what have you. I did that many, many times in the
Soviet Union, but that was my first time, and it was an experience I’ll never forget, talking to
these people [who] can’t just express their religion. I mean, they’re not talking about trying to
change the Soviet Union [in]to a democracy; they just would like to be able to go to [religious
services], and raise their kids in the Jewish religion. And then we met some Baptists that were
[in the same boat]. [I] went out of my way to not just make it a Jewish issue, because I wanted to
be able to appeal to a greater audience at home.
Traveling with members is a great way to get to know them, when you see them almost twentyfour hours a day, or at least twelve or sixteen hours a day, and you get to see the real side, and
their wives, too.
BW:

While we’re on that topic, did you do CODELs with Mitchell at all?
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DC: I did, I did. The first CODEL he went on, I can’t remember what year it was, and he was
the junior guy there and we went to the Soviet Union. And I was not the chairman of it, and he,
he took a picture of me sleeping on the plane and later handed it to me on the floor, and he says,
“Dennis, if I don’t get your -” (he was kidding of course). “If I don’t get your vote,” he said,
“I’m going to turn this over to the Arizona Republic.” He knew the newspaper, I’m sitting,
snoring – just a terrible picture. So, I’ll never forget that.
And then he had – I think Sally was his wife’s name, she was with him [p/o] – I think that’s the
only CODEL I went on with George. I went on a lot of them as chairman, with Steny Hoyer and
Al D’Amato of the [ ] Helsinki Commission, [or] the Commission on Security and Cooperation,
the congressional [human rights committee] – I worked myself up there for about four years,
Russell Long finally handed it over to me, he said, “I don’t need this anymore,” so I was next in
line so I became the Senate ranking member, or chairman of it and so I traveled all over, mostly
under the auspices of the Helsinki Commission. And Mitchell met us once, he was on another
CODEL, I can’t remember where it was. It was back after we were in London [ ] and I
remember him joining us. [p/o]
BW:
-?

The Helsinki Commission, was that, did that consist mainly of members of Congress, or

DC: Yes, all members of Congress, all the members appointed by the leadership, it was
bipartisan. I think the Democrats had one vote, but it switched back [and forth] to the [ ] House
and Senate. Steny Hoyer was chairman, and then I’d be chairman, and then when the
Republicans took over under Reagan, Al D’Amato became chairman on the Senate side, and I
can’t remember who was on the Republican side [p/o].
BW:

And in a word, what was the mission?

DC: A Helsinki Accord was signed [into law in] 1974 when Ford was president, and he
signed it in Helsinki. And Brezhnev [ ] was the secretary general of the Communist Party and
the dictator of the Soviet Union, he signed that accord in Helsinki, and he signed for all of the
Soviet Union republics [ ]. And I guess he did it because he didn’t think anything of it and he
didn’t want the bad publicity of not doing it, and maybe there was some deal going on to release
some prisoners or something, I don’t know, but he signed it. And from their standpoint, it
became a huge mistake because every time we met with them in any international meeting, the
Soviets would send a delegation [ ], including the UN, [and] they would get beat up for not
complying [with the Accord].
And the Helsinki Accord just was a basic human rights [accord], the right to express your
opinion, right to practice your own religion, right to read and not be monitored, right to travel
and, it was not something revolutionary, because it didn’t say you could take up arms and revolt
against your government, it was just that your government was supposed to do [what] they
signed [ ]. And so it was something that I got deeply involved in, and traveled to the Soviet
Union probably seventeen or eighteen times before the Wall came down.
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BW: Just continuing on that line a bit, did George Mitchell have a strong commitment to these
kinds of issues, foreign affairs and whatnot, and if so DC: [ ] I didn’t serve on any committees with Senator Mitchell. First let me give you a little
anecdote, and if you don’t want to use it, it’s fine, but my relationship with George started off in
a peculiar way. When he was running for chairman of the National Democratic Party, [ ] and I
wasn’t here then – I was the prosecutor and the vice chairman of the Democratic Party of
Arizona, and my mother was National Committeewoman [for Arizona]. And she went to the
convention, and Mitchell was really a young star coming up, and he was running against,
unfortunately, somebody you couldn’t beat and that was Bob Strauss, Sr., and my mother had
become friends with him.
BW:

With Strauss.

DC: With Strauss, so she cast her vote for [him], and George Mitchell came to see my mother
and I – my mother told me this story – and my mother really liked George Mitchell, but she had
to go with the friend, family friend, [his] son who lived in Tucson. So Mitchell, first time I meet
Mitchell he tells me, “Your mother voted against me.” And so we used to laugh about that all
the time. And when he became leader I said, “I’m sorry, would you like an apology from my
mother, she’s still living in Arizona.” He said “No, it’s not necessary.”
I didn’t serve on any committees [with him], but Mitchell [was] such a bright guy, you could just
see it immediately when you got to know him, and where I got to know him probably better than
anything else was on the Steering Committee. I was put on the Steering Committee as one of the
freshmen – [ ] there were two of us, just Jim Sasser and I – we were the only freshmen
Democrats put on the Steering Committee, if you know what that is, the Democratic Steering
Committee. There was about fifteen or sixteen put on by Byrd, [and] because I chose Byrd for
majority leader [ ] he rewarded me, and also helped me get on the Appropriations Committee.
So when I got on there, after a [few years], I started to figure out how to use the members on this
committee to trade off the votes so I could get westerners on the Appropriations Committee to
help Arizona with the Central Arizona Project [p/o]. And Harry Reid was one that came along,
and a couple others [p/o] – I helped Harkin. So when [senators requested to be on the
Appropriations Committee] I would argue for them because I had helped them get elected, did a
little bit of raising money for them [p/o].
Well when Mitchell came in, I was still on the Steering Committee. Mitchell saw this right
away, so he changed the rules [ ] so the nominations [to the Steering Committee] were made by
him, by the majority leader, and then you could come up with another nominee but he started to
[take] control. And I thought, ‘this guy’s really smart’ – and Byrd’s smart too, [but] I don’t think
Byrd had figured that out. Mitchell had sat on that committee when he first came here, shortly
after, he became the chairman of the Democratic Campaign Committee, and he figured it out
right away, he said, “DeConcini and Sasser, some of these young guys are rolling the chairman,
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getting who they want on instead of the majority leader,” and when he became majority leader
that changed. At least in my perception – with no animosity, just admiration.
But Mitchell was so outstanding, he used to come down to the Senate’s private dining room and
sit there and have lunch with us, [p/o] and no other leader did that except Bob Dole on the
Republican side, and once in a while Howard Baker. But he’d come down there a couple times a
week and sit there, and I explained all that in my book, and he was really good. I sat there and
just watched him. And then when he ran for majority leader I didn’t support him, I supported
Bennett Johnston, and I really had a hard time there because I really thought Mitchell would be a
great leader, and he was, he was just outstanding.
BW:

Well that was an interesting part of your book, because you said actually you -

DD:

Wanted to support Inouye.

BW: That’s right, and then voted for Johnston, and Mitchell won. So explain that, explain
yourself.
DD: Well, Dan Inouye had helped me so much, as had Johnston, they were both on [the]
Appropriations Committee, they were always helping me, and we started going to the Virgin
Islands with the family at Christmas time, and Bennett Johnston was down there with his family,
and his kids went to the same high school [as mine]. So we didn’t become tight social friends,
but every Christmas we’d spend a couple days down there with our families on a boat together.
So I got to know him and [ ] so he asked me [if I would support him for majority leader], [ ] and
I just said yes, and then I went to Inouye and explained [that] to him. He was so nice, I’ll never
forget that guy, he says, “It’s okay, I understand those friendships.” And then he never held it
against me at all, he just came back and helped me so much, and during the Keating thing he
volunteered to come testify for me, and Bennett Johnston didn’t, and that’s okay but it just shows
you what a great man Inouye was.
And Mitchell, he asked me, and I explained to him and he said, “That’s okay, Dennis, I
understand,” he says. I can’t remember if he said, ‘you’re going to wish you did this,’ or
something like it, just a little kidding, Mitchell was good at that. Like, well, ‘I’ll get you next
time,’ I guess that’s what he said, something like that.
BW:

So this was in the conversation the two of you had prior to the election.

DD:

Yeah, when he was trying to get -

BW:

I would -

DD: I said I didn’t serve on a committee [with Mitchell, but actually] I did serve on the
Veterans’ Affairs Committee with George [ ].
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BW: Just going back to the leadership vote, putting myself in your position, it would be hard
for me to say to a colleague, I’m not going to vote for you, but essentially that’s what you did.
DD: That’s what you had to do here, I had to do that the first couple of months here, for [the]
majority leader. You had Hubert Humphrey who, my family had worked for him, my brother
had advanced his campaign in Arizona and New Mexico, and I knew him [ ]. My mother was
National Committeewoman, she knew him, [and she] liked the guy so much. And then you had
Fritz Hollings, who I didn’t know but [who was] just insatiably nice, and starts sending me
money, as soon as I get elected I get a check, and I get another check. And then you had Bob
Byrd, who did come forward a little bit before [the] election and sent me a check from his PAC [
].
So we come back here, and you have to say no. And that’s really not easy, because you don’t
know how they’re going to take it. So George Mitchell certainly never indicated any animosity
as a result. I was not one of his lieutenants, and that might have been partly on purpose because I
was always a little leery of getting too close to the leadership here. Not that I could have got
elected, but I didn’t want to be chairman of the Policy Committee or deputy, deputy whip or
anything, because I had to go get elected in Arizona so it just wasn’t good for a guy like me to do
that. And [Jeff] Bingaman has kind of been the same way, just one guy that I know that – at
least he hasn’t done that, I don’t know if that’s why [ ] he hasn’t tried to, he wants to be
chairman but he doesn’t want to be in the leadership because he comes from a somewhat
conservative state. [That’s my opinion.]
BW:

You and Mitchell served on Intelligence, too, there.

DD:

And served on Intelligence, yeah.

BW:

And for a while you were chair.

DD:

I was chair, yeah.

BW: And did being chair of Intelligence put you in a special position in terms of the
leadership of the Democratic Party?
DD: How it works, Brien (and you may know this), because he was [the] leader he was
entitled to the Group of Eight, as I was, there were two of us on the Senate side and the majority
leader and minority leader [ ], and then on the House side. So we got the briefings, but rarely did
we get them with the majority and the minority leader, mostly because of scheduling. On
occasion, there would be those briefings, but mostly [ ] George did not attend a lot of the
meetings when I was on the committee, and certainly when I was chairman, which was
understandable, that just goes without saying.
He did have a staff person there. I can’t remember who it was – [he] was a senior staff person
that he brought on the committee. In those days you could bring [your staff] on, everybody got
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to bring somebody on, and then after [the chairman] went off, if they were really good the next
person would keep them, and if they weren’t, they went back to your office. And I can’t
remember who Mitchell had, but he had somebody there that was really good, because I used to
work with him, and my chief of staff there on the Intelligence Committee would tell me, this
guy’s solid, we can do anything with him, and he’ll talk to the leader and what have you.
So, most of the intelligence or joint stuff was not done face-to-face with Mitchell. I do
remember him coming to some committee meetings, particularly on [the] confirmation of CIA
director, [or the] NRO director, something like that, he would come and vote for it in the
committee and maybe make a statement or something, but he wasn’t there at the hearings,
because he had a lot of other things to do.
BW: On the other side, with him as chairman, or as leader, did he sometimes meet with the
group of chairs, or did you not have special standing in the leadership of the Democratic -?
DD: Well, yes, he would meet with [us]. He would have the chairs over to his office, in the
conference room, when there was [ ] major legislation that we were trying to [bring to the floor].
The one that comes to my mind is the Crime Bill, and Biden was chairman [of the Judiciary
Committee]. [p/o] But there was only about fifteen or eighteen and I was there, and most of the
chairs were there. This was a big deal; they wanted to get all the votes together.
But if you read my book, as I explained, how Mitchell did it, at least with people like me, and
other members told me the same thing, is he’d come to lunch and ask your opinion, and then
when he gets up he says, “Dennis, can you come around later in the week, I’ll call you.” Well
sure. So then he’d call you over [to his office], and then he would have the key senators on the
issue that he wanted to talk to you about, Kennedy and Biden, or Stennis and Nunn or something
like that, and that’s how he worked. And it was very persuasive. Peer pressure, [but not in] a
way that you felt offended that if you don’t do this you’re going to [be punished in some way].
Now with Byrd it was a little different. When you crossed Byrd, you paid a price. And the man,
I say that with great respect because [he] put me in a position to be on the Appropriations
Committee [my] first year [in the Senate], and [also to] be on the Policy [sic: Steering]
Committee, and it wouldn’t have happened without him. But later I crossed him, because I
wasn’t following the liberal line that he wanted to go down on legislation, and you paid a price.
Mitchell never expressed that. If you voted against Mitchell he just, at least with me, he just
accepted it. And then if you wanted to, you’d offer your amendment. [If] he was on the floor he
didn’t say, ‘I’m sorry, you didn’t help me last week,’ as other majority leaders might do, and did,
but not Mitchell. He said, “Sure, get in line, here it is, you can say what you want now.”
BW: You served with four leaders, Byrd, Baker, Dole, and Mitchell. Sort of describe their
styles and how they were different.
DD:

Byrd was a master of the Senate even before he became [universally known as] a master
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of the Senate. It was his life; he was a very Southern gentleman, but tough as nails and wanted
his way. And he usually got it, because when he became leader, I think there were sixty-four or
sixty-five Democrats so it was a lot easier. Later it became a lot harder, and certainly when
Mitchell was leader it became more difficult because we had fifty-three or fifty-four [ ]. And he
was tireless, Byrd was, he just was tireless. And he was a guy that would, I remember during the
Panama Canal, I think I put it in my book, he came over to my office to see me, freshman
senator, I’m only in my second year here, and the leader never goes to [any member’s] office,
you always go [to his]. He comes over to see me, so I know this is heavy duty, and he said, don’t
come [out against] this, because he was trying to get me to vote for it.
And you really respected him because he was so knowledgeable, and he was on the Judiciary
Committee at the time with me, on the Appropriations Committee, so he was somebody I had to
work with. But he could be difficult if you crossed him, and you didn’t want to cross Byrd
because he had a memory that didn’t let you go. And I just wrote him a letter, because I sent him
some pictures that he came out for a fund raiser for me right after I was elected; he, Cranston,
and Claiborne Pell came out, and I had these pictures. A good looking guy, too, in those days, as
handsome as could be, with his fiddle. And I’m so indebted to the guy that I don’t want to say
anything negative at all, except that’s what I would say: if you crossed him, you could pay a
price.
Baker, along with Mitchell probably, were the most outstanding leaders because they were
leaders that were willing to take some risks. And leaders, in my opinion Dole and Byrd, they
wanted to be sure that everything was going to go the way they had planned, where Baker – and
with Panama Canal’s the best chance, it was just outstanding to do what he did. That canal treaty
would never have passed, not with DeConcini[’s amendment] or anybody else’s, had Howard
Baker not decided, ‘I’m going to do this, this is the right thing to do.’ Those are the kind of
people you don’t forget when you serve with them.
And Dole was more in the line of Byrd, he wanted things running, he wanted to run the train.
And there’s no objection to that, and that’s how I would probably want to be a leader. And
Mitchell was more on the Baker side. So they were all great leaders, because Baker was very
kind to me on the Panama Canal Treaty [issue], I talked to him a couple of times because I was
wondering why he would be out there, and what do I do, and I’m going to change my mind, he
was very nice to me.
And then Dole had such a sense of humor, you couldn’t stay mad at Dole even when he voted
against you or did something you didn’t like. Dole was just a master at using self-deprecation [ ]
and everything else, and he was a master at it. And of all of them, they’re all very good, but
Mitchell was the best, in my opinion. And I say that with reverence to the other three, because I
like them so much and I thought they were all good, but Mitchell was, and I don’t know if it’s
because my father was a judge and I saw some things in Mitchell that reminded of sound
judgment and not rushing to judgment, as a lot of people do, particularly political people,
including myself. Mitchell thought [matters] out, and when he came to his conclusion, he had
really thought it out. I always got that feeling, even if I disagreed with him.
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BW:

The leader has so many fingers in so many pies, I would think.

DD:

Yes, he does.

BW:

For many, I guess for the whole time that he was leader, he was not married.

DD: A long time, yes. I can’t remember how many years he was here before he got divorced
from, I think it was Sally.
BW:

I think it was ‘87.

DD:

‘Eighty-seven?

BW:

I believe so, just before he became leader. I think I’m right on that.

DD: Yeah, I think he was here four years before he became leader, because he became leader
faster than anybody, and it had a lot to do with his success winning the Senate back, because
everybody gave him credit for it, everybody. And he worked all the members, but he was
tireless, and when we won everybody said, gee, George Mitchell was the guy, and nobody
disputed that. Not even Bob Byrd or anybody else would dispute that, yeah, it was Mitchell that
did it.
BW:

And where was he focusing his energy?

DD:

You mean in -

BW:

‘Eighty-six, with the successful campaign.

DD: Campaigning, he was raising money and speaking for people, and consequently, he made
a lot of friends and that’s the way he was, and those friendships you don’t forget. Some senator
coming out and speaking for you, like Alan Cranston did for me in my campaign, in my primary,
because I had some mutual friends, you just don’t forget somebody like that. And Mitchell did
that for, I don’t know, ten or twelve people. [p/o] All the people that won, Mitchell was the guy
that not only delivered the check, but they all told me, he came down [to their states] two or three
times, he sent people down [ ], paid for it, I mean he invested a lot, and you don’t forget that kind
of thing. And probably had he done that for me, I probably would have voted for him too.
BW:

Did he play any role in your ‘88 reelection?

DD: I think he came out for me, I think he came out for me, and I’m sorry, Brien, I can’t
remember. [p/o] I think he came out just for an event – he came out I think with Bill Bradley
[p/o]. [They] made a speech [ ] in Scottsdale for me, I’m almost sure that was [in] ‘88. And that
was helpful, having the majority leader. The nice thing he did is after I retired. I had a dinner,
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they had a dinner for me, and it was a tough time for me, I was going through a divorce. Barry
Goldwater came to my dinner and the governor came, and Mitchell came out for my dinner.
And he had done some research on how much money I had gotten for Arizona in earmarks, and
he got up and he made this speech, he says, “With all due respect Barry, all due respect Mo
Udall, and everybody else here, there hasn’t been anybody since Carl Hayden,” he’d done some
research, “that’s done more for Arizona.” He starts listing all this stuff, and I’m almost
embarrassed, but he went out of his way just to honor me.
I’ll never forget it, I’ll never forget that, because I was surprised he came out. They invited him,
and he said “Oh yeah, I want to go say something about my friend Dennis,” is what he told my
staff. And I’ll never forget that as long as I live. He’s quite a guy, George Mitchell, and boy, [if]
anybody deserves a Nobel Peace Prize [it is Mitchell for all of his hard work on Northern
Ireland]. I’ve been to Northern Ireland a lot of times, and I went there long before Mitchell did,
with the Helsinki Commission. Hoyer and I went, and I went on my own and I met with Paisley
and I met with Maguire [sic: McGuinness] and all these guys trying to say, ‘you got to find
something better.’ I had no influence at all. Of course, I only stayed four days. But Mitchell
putting that together, and his staffer, I forgot her name BW:

Martha Pope.

DD: Yeah, Martha Pope, she was so great [ ]. I didn’t know her real well but she’s so smart,
when she worked here in the Senate and then she helped put that together. So I’ve been back
there, and if you’ve been to Ireland, particularly Northern Ireland but any [part of] Ireland, they
think Mitchell is like a prime minister. I mean honest to God, it’s Saint George there, and
rightfully so. And I was just there two years ago and it was just marvelous, what a change, and I
hadn’t been there for about ten years, and what a change, what a change. I mean he’s a master at
relationships, he’s got a knack that not too many people [have] – if he pulls this off in the Middle
East, it’ll be really a miracle.
BW:

Well, back to my question -

DD:

I’m sorry, I got -

BW: No-no, that’s - Did the fact that he was not terribly involved in his personal life, didn’t
have a lot of things going on in his personal life free him up to be particularly DD: I think so, yeah, I think so, I do. On the other hand, you take Bob Byrd, who had a
devoted wife [ ], I don’t know how much Irma ever saw him. He’d always talk about Irma, and
he’d bring her to functions, but the guy just lived [in the Senate] and I’m sure many nights he
stayed overnight because he just didn’t want to go home. So it kind of comes with the territory,
but certainly I believe that helped George not [to] feel the pull and stress from that side of the
family. What had happened had happened, and it was behind him. And it was before he, he had
a couple of romances here that, people would see him, I forgot the lady from the State
Department that he was going out with – nice lady. I knew her, and that was always in the Style
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section [of the Washington Post], but I don’t think it interfered with his leadership at all.
BW: He came to the Senate in 1980, when Ed Muskie went over to the State Department. Do
you recall your sort of first impressions of George Mitchell?
DD: My recollection is, he came on the floor, [p/o] and then he tells a famous story about,
when he’s right there and we’re having a filibuster and we’re all sleeping in [ ] the caucus room
there, and he’s next to John Warner, who’s married to [Elizabeth Taylor] – [I] just love that
story. And I was there when he told that story, maybe not the first time but early, early, before
he was leader or anything else, at lunch he tells this story, and I thought, that’s a great story. I
remember asking him, “Can I use that story?” He said, “Sure.” I used to use that story [p/o].
But I met him one or two days right after he was appointed, because he came in in the middle of
everything, it wasn’t like a normal swearing-in. He came down here, I can’t remember, we were
having a vote I think the night he came in on something, and I don’t know if I met him that night
but I met him certainly the next day.
BW:

And when did it occur to you that this guy had potential?

DD: Well, it didn’t occur to me until [I saw] the following he [had] developed, through being
chairman of the DSCC [p/o]. I thought, “This guy is [really special],” you know, because [he
had all] these new people coming in – [were running and got help from him, the stories] were
just amazing. And you talk to Steve Symms, Steve was very friendly to him, even though he
went out and tried to beat Steve, and I’m sure Steve told you the story. And it was hard to not
like George Mitchell, just like Steve Symms, one of the most popular, nicest guys, though he’s
far, far to the right than I am. I was more in the middle [ ], but he’s just one of the nicest guys.
And Mitchell had the same kind of infectious capability of friendship. And that’s when I knew,
when we won the Senate back, long before anybody said George was going to run, you knew this
guy was a comer. And he’s only been here four years or something like that, and all of a sudden
he’s [the leader]. It took me twelve years to become chairman of [a] committee, not a
subcommittee but a committee, and so here he is, really a player.
And in the Veterans’ Committee, he used to come to that committee. I can’t remember any
particular legislation [he was involved in], but he was very interested in veterans. I never knew
quite why, if his dad had been a veteran or what it was, but he wanted to do something for
veterans in his state, and I remember him being there and participating. And before he ran for
the [leader], before he was the head of the DSCC or whatever it was, he came and did his work
there in a manner that just demonstrated, he wasn’t trying to show off, he was trying to do
something. And I didn’t serve on the Finance Committee, he was on Finance, or [p/o]
Commerce, I didn’t serve on those committees so I didn’t see him in operation [except on the
Veterans’ Committee].
BW: You mentioned sleeping in the cots. It seemed to me that in an earlier time in the Senate
that happened, not exactly regularly, but quite a few times. And I haven’t heard of overnights for
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a long time.
DD:

They don’t do that anymore.

BW:

Why not?

DD: Probably because of George Mitchell, and maybe Dole. Byrd and Baker were into that,
‘we’ll force this through; we’ll stay here.’ And Byrd thought nothing of keeping us here three
days, and hauling in the cots and it was always a threat for anybody who was going to filibuster,
particularly if you’re a Democrat, like Abourezk or Metzenbaum or somebody that’s going to
filibuster, or Allen from Alabama, who was here when I came here, a very conservative
Democrat, a problem to Byrd on almost everything Byrd was trying to do for the Carter
administration. And Mitchell and Dole, and I don’t know this for a fact, but I suspect Dole
didn’t want to do that either when he was leader. And Baker I don’t think had a lot of options,
because Byrd was running the show.
But Dole I think didn’t want to do that either so he was, ‘let’s organize it so we’ll talk ‘til two
o’clock and then we’ll go home, we’ll come back at eleven,’ and that’s how Mitchell did it,
which was a great relief. It still dragged out, [but] people got to do what they want, but you
didn’t punish those of us who just sat around usually when it wasn’t our issue. And you really
felt you were being punished, notwithstanding the friendships, you were just, sleeping down
there at night when your family was home; [it] just wasn’t something which you thought was in
the game plan for being a senator.
End of CD One
CD Two
BW:

Talk about the role of the filibuster over your period of time in the Senate.

DD: Well, I came here, and [ ] I thought they should have [a] vote. That’s when I got at cross
purposes with Byrd, because I would support cloture. I thought, no, we should [have a] vote on
these issues, that’s what we’re here for. And later came where you had to have a super majority
for some times, so you can still protect, it takes more than fifty-one votes. And I still have that
philosophical approach, that we would be better [off] if one senator [couldn’t] go there and hold
up the [entire] body.
Not a lot of fine senators before me [or] after me will be contrary to that view; they feel it’s an
obligation, it comes with the office, it’s a duty for your state, and I know all the arguments. And
Claiborne Pell was the other guy that had the same philosophy as I did, and I don’t know if I got
it from him or I just came with it, but I [really admired] Claiborne Pell. He had a son who lived
in Tucson that I knew, [who] was in the automobile business, and became a little bit of a friend
of mine, and so I liked Claiborne so much, [I] had so much respect for him, and I used to talk to
him about this. And he’d done a lot of research on it, in his own mind and what have you, and I
don’t remember it but he would give me the same reasons, kind of bolster why I [had taken the
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position I had]. So I can’t remember more than two or three times I ever voted, not [to end] the
filibuster, even when the Democrats wanted it. If the Republicans wanted it, it sometimes made
it even worse, when we were in the minority.
BW: Another thing I wanted to ask you is about trips home. Did you right through your
career sort of have the same average number of trips per year, or did that change?
DD: Pretty much so. When I ran, people didn’t go home on the weekend. Barry Goldwater
was here, if he went home once a month it was a lot, maybe not even once a month. He had a
nice home, a big condo here, and he was bullet proof out there almost. And this guy Ernest
McFarland that he beat was the same way, rarely went home. Carl Hayden was the icon of
Arizona, he hardly went home, and then of course he was [in his nineties], he couldn’t go home
the last term he was there, I used to work in his campaigns.
So when I ran, one of the things I said, “I’m going to be here at least two weekends out of every
month.” And that was kind of revolutionary: my God, this guy’s going to come back this often.
Which I did, and sometimes three, and some of it was just out of self preservation, I needed it
because I wasn’t the Goldwater, or even the Udall, and so I started doing that. Well, pretty soon
we get, these guys get elected that are going back every week, like John McCain did for a long
time, and Jon Kyl did, and J.D. Hayworth never rented a place here, the congressman, he slept in
his office. We had a breakfast here yesterday for Jason Chaffetz, from Utah, who I just met, and
he doesn’t have a place here to sleep, so they go back every weekend.
That was just almost unheard of in those days. You had Joe Biden, and [Bill Roth]. Oh gosh,
great guy, nice guy, and they’d just go back every day, which I thought, geez, how would you do
that? So it was twice a month for sure, and often three times, unless I was on a CODEL, which
would be maybe once a year, at best.
BW:

Senator Roth?

DD:

Senator Roth, yeah, Bill Roth, thank you.

BW: You had some very important issues that you stuck with pretty much over your career,
and I’m interested in your identifying those, and then telling me whether Mitchell was important
to your working DD: Well, you know, my issues dealt with a couple of areas. One was Western issues,
Arizona, dealing with water. That was just important and drummed into me, my father had been
on the State Stream Commission, [and he] was a good friend of Carl Hayden, [who] got the
Central Arizona Project [authorized], and then I had to get the money, [or] help get the money
[to fund the project]. And Morris Udall was on the House side, though he was not on the
Appropriations Committee, I was, and John Rhodes, who [ ] was the minority leader, he was on
the Appropriations Committee, so I started off with a little bit of a history here to follow that up.
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And that’s where I spent a great deal of my time, not just on the Central Arizona Project, but on
constituent service in Arizona. I was determined that I was going to be the best constituent
service senator, and that’s what my staff did [for me]. So whether or not it was a veteran [ ] not
getting their benefits, if you come to DeConcini’s office, if the staff thought it was necessary, I’d
call the secretary, or the director of the hospital, or if it was an issue with the Interior Department
for the Native Americans, what have you, that’s where I spent a great deal of my time,
particularly [during] my first term – [I was] just determined. And it was very helpful because
with the Panama Canal, it turned out to be maybe my lifeline [p/o].
Having been in law enforcement, I spent a lot of time on [the] Judiciary Committee, as well as
[the] Appropriations Committee, doing things for law enforcement. One of the things I passed
was the pay increase that John Glenn and Ted Stevens, or no, it was Bill Roth, John Glenn; Bill
Roth had it in their committee and just never got around to bringing it out. And Steny Hoyer
[and I] put it on our appropriations bill, we passed it, and it made me really [nationally]
recognized in law enforcement. And I had done a lot of stuff before then, but this all of a sudden
– and I always was very favorable to law enforcement so I spent a lot of time trying to improve
law enforcement, whether it was Border Patrol or Customs or ATF or the FBI, and those were
issues that I really liked, because I [was on] both Appropriations and [ ] Judiciary Committee[s].
Mitchell was not hands-on with that stuff. I don’t remember him ever saying, “Dennis, how
come you’re putting all this money in [the] Border Patrol?” It just wasn’t an issue to him. It was
for Fritz Hollings because he had the Appropriations [Sub]committee that actually [funded the
Border Patrol]. And I used to put it in my bill, and then he would sometimes take it out of my
bill, if his bill came later, because he wanted it someplace else. So those are the kind of things I
worked [on].
With Mitchell, on the Intelligence Committee I remember talking to him when we had
Haynesworth [sic: Aldrich Ames] I guess it was, the spy, I said in my book too, who had turned
all the [U.S.] Soviet spies over to the Soviets BW:

You’re talking about Aldrich Ames.

(brief exhchange omitted)
DD: [ ] Aldrich Ames, so I remember talking to Mitchell about it, about how far Warner and I
both wanted to pursue this, with the problems between the FBI and the CIA non-[cooperation].
And I do remember Mitchell listening to both Warner and I, and I can’t remember if we even had
any staff there, we were obviously well briefed, and he was totally supportive. And we all knew
what we were talking about here, because we all had had some [knowledge about the]
relationship [ ] problem between the CIA and the FBI and how they dealt with espionage, and the
DIA, the Defense Intelligence; they all have a different view of how you should handle contacts
and informants and how you do it. And Warner and I had agreed that we wanted to go into depth
here and find out why this happened. I’m not sure we did, but we went into real depth.
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Before doing that, I had to have Mitchell’s approval [ ] or his concurrence because I knew
there’d be resistance from the administration of doing that, from the director of the FBI, director
of CIA, director of DIA, the secretary. And Mitchell [said], “You guys are doing the right thing,
do you realize -” I think he said something like, “Do you realize what you’re taking on?” And
Warner couldn’t have been a greater co-ranking member because he and I got along so well.
And Mitchell asked me a couple times, “How’s it going?” And I would, my recollection is I
said, “George, if you’ve got time, you ought to have (whoever his staff guy was) just come over
and tell you, because he’s in on everything.”
And in that course of Aldrich Ames – thank you for remembering his name – we concluded that
there was a mole in the FBI. We didn’t know who it was – it turned out to be the guy who wrote
the book – [I] can’t think of his name either now. But we found that out, and I remember so well
being sure that Mitchell’s staff member knew what we were confronting the FBI with, because
we were telling them, “You got somebody there.” “Ha, we don’t have him.” And [p/o] it finally
came out, he was a big Catholic and – I want to say Hess, but that wasn’t it.
BW:

Hanssen?

DD: Hanssen, Hanssen, and we didn’t know it was [Robert Philip] Hanssen, but we got into
this because we looked at all – they didn’t have e-mails then – all the faxes and some of the
recorded phone conversations between the CIA and the DIA and FBI, and what they did share
and what they didn’t share, and we had some pretty good investigators on our staff that were able
to trace some sharing of information that only some mole could have, somebody doing the wrong
thing in the FBI had done. We tried to present that to the FBI, I think it was Sessions then, and I
like him a lot but he wasn’t too receptive, but I wanted to be sure Mitchell knew about it, and I
presume his staffer did it, because Mitchell never mentioned anything to me [except his support].
BW:

And then you took on James Woolsey.

DD: I took on James Woolsey, yeah, James Woolsey was real difficult for me, because I
thought he was going to be such a great director, and he started off real good but - That’s all in
my book, about how he expected us to just put all this money in, and he didn’t have the White
House [support], and Warner and I thought it should go into human intelligence and he wanted to
use it for language and some other things, and so we put it in human intelligence and he didn’t
like it, he really didn’t like it. And I had to go down and see the president about it, because he
was telling people I was disclosing classified information, which of course [I was not]. And
[National Security Advisor] Tony Lake called me and said, “The president has talked to him.” I
don’t know if that really happened or not, but that was good enough for me.
BW:

What about your campaign, I think this is right, against assault weapons?

DD: Well that was a difficult thing for me, because I had been [the] NRA Man of the Month
in Arizona, and I just didn’t think there was a big problem. And after, not Columbine, [but] the
[tragedy] in Sacramento, there was a high school up there and a shooting, in 1988 or something
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like that, and I got the pictures of it. So I immediately talked to the NRA, because I had good
contacts with them, and I said, “We need to do something, you need to do something.” And
because they liked me, I think, and I’d been such an ally, we really worked on it for a long time.
And they finally just told me flat out, “Sorry, Senator, we lose members if we go along with this.
And now, we’re not going to call for your resignation and try to run you out of office, because
you’ve been a good friend and we know where you’re going here” [p/o].
So I had a staff guy who was just really good, and we took this on, in a way that we thought was
really responsible, and as you know, it passed by one vote. And to her great credit [Sen. Dianne]
Feinstein took it over and, [with no reluctance, I] was glad to have somebody [take on the issue],
because I was leaving and I wasn’t going to be around. And she took it over, and Biden really
got on board. Biden was okay with what I was doing, but Biden really got on board when he saw
the persistence that [Sen.] Feinstein had and the beginning success, and ultimate success, she had
over in the House. [p/o]
But I was extremely proud of passing that bill, and as I point out in the book, some of the people
that changed [their positions] on it, [like] Bentsen and Nunn, who’d never voted for it, and then
of course Al D’Amato doing it just out of friendship for me, it passed by two votes I think. And
those are the kind of things you just [ ] remember when you have a success like that, because you
have a lot of failures.
BW:

Was Mitchell, what was his relationship like with the NRA and on these issues?

DD: Well he was for this bill, but he had a good relationship with [the] NRA, to my
recollection. I don’t remember why or how, but he was not a target like Kennedy or
Metzenbaum were every time they spoke. And I don’t remember them demonizing Mitchell.
Maybe later in his career they did, because he did support all these gun control bills, but my
recollection [was that] he had a decent relationship with the NRA. I don’t know if that’s
accurate, Brien, but that’s my recollection. But he supported my bill.
BW: On trade, you might have had some differences of opinion with George Mitchell, like
what about NAFTA?
DD: I was big on NAFTA. I can’t remember where Mitchell was, if he was even here when
Pete Wilson was [serving] from California. But Pete Wilson and I took on Mexico, and we had a
resolution condemning Mexico, and I think prohibiting them from flying airplanes in here or
something just dramatic, and it passed [the Senate]. I don’t know where Mitchell [was], if he
was even here then, and Tip O’Neill was still here so maybe Mitchell wasn’t here, Tip O’Neill
just said, it’s not going anyplace [ ]. But Mitchell was more of a free-trader, is my recollection,
he really believed in [it], he was on the committees that had some [jurisdiction].
I was more of a protectionist, until NAFTA came, and I was convinced by a lot of different
people but mostly Arizona constituents that this was good, so I switched camps there. And as I
became chairman and more knowledgeable in the international field, mostly due to [my service]
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on the Appropriations [Sub]committee for Foreign Affairs, [and] on the Helsinki Commission,
which really gave me a wide perspective of what foreign policy was, rather than just Arizona’s
view of it.
BW: Were you with George Mitchell when he met with Bush One and Clinton White Houses
very often, and if so, what did you witness?
DD: I went down there at least once, if not twice, with Mitchell when Clinton was there –
because I was only here for the first two years of Clinton, and it was on health care and I was just
kind of one of the guys that Clinton or Mitchell called down there. I was not a real player, I was
just there and I had objections, but I was not one of the leaders there. And I’m trying to think
about Bush, I don’t remember with Bush. Now [George H.W.] Bush, the first Bush, I really
liked. He asked me to be the drug czar and what have you [ ]. This guy [i.e. George W. Bush]
was not a chip off the old block, the second Bush. I do remember going down there, I don’t
know who I was with, and I remember Mitchell being there, there were ten or twelve of us, but I
don’t remember what [the issue] was. Do you know what it was? No? You don’t either, you
didn’t come up here?
BW:

Were you surprised when George Mitchell said, “I’m not going to run again?”

DD: I was surprised. I sat next to him in the caucus, I had already announced [that I was not
going to run], and he sat down, we were having lunch, and I’m sure he told other people, and he
said, “Well Dennis, good luck,” and one thing and another. And somebody was speaking and I
said, “George, what are you going to do?” He said, “I’m going to retire.” I was just taken aback,
I thought he was at the pinnacle of his success, I was quite taken aback. I said, “George, you’re
going to retire, why?” He says, “I just got to, I got to move on, I got to make some money, I’ve
got to make some money, and I love this job but,” he said, “it’s time for me to move on.”
Because I don’t know how old he was, but he was younger than I was, and I was taken aback.
And he did make some money.
I remember meeting he and his [friend], I don’t think he was married yet, the tennis player, down
in Miami at a Super Bowl game, we were at the same restaurant there. And they were sitting
next to us, so we kibitzed a little bit, and I never got to know her very well but she seemed like
such a nice, nice lady. And they had one or two children? Two?
BW:

Two.

DD:

Two, yeah.

BW:

Conservative Democrat, is that an endangered species these days, or not?

DD: Well, it depends on how you play it. It just depends how you play it. If you’re lucky
and you’re smart, you can be a conservative Democrat. If you’re unlucky and you’re not smart,
you—same thing with the Republican Party—you become an Arlen Specter. So you have to
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pick your battles, and you have to keep your home base strong for you. And I was able to do
that, a lot of other senators came from conservative states and they were Democrats, Sam Nunn
and people like that. And of course the South is a little bit different, but still the same way, Jeff
Bingaman, you can – no, I wouldn’t say it’s over. I think we never called ourselves
conservative. Middle of the road, centrist Democrats, we never said, ‘oh, we’re conservative,’
because we didn’t want to do that, unless we were in a Republican conservative environment,
[then] maybe we would.
BW:

Were you ever invited to join the Republican Party?

DD: Oh yeah, I was, by Strom Thurmond, and Bob Dole just mentioned it to me, that he
understood that Thurmond had talked to me about it, and I told Thurmond, I said, “I couldn’t
possibly do that.” And he said, “I promise you, you’ll have the same committee, the same staff,
the same offices, everything,” he says, “you won’t lose [anything].” And Thad Strom out here is
his nephew, and worked for him for a long time. And Strom liked me, I liked him too, we used
to get along quite well, and I told him, I think I put that in my book too that my dad is a
Democrat and he would never forgive me, he’s a conservative Democrat and he’d never forgive
me. And he said, “Yes he will.” He says, “I was a Democrat and I changed, they forgave me, my
parents forgave me, my family forgave me,” he said, “then after forgiving me, they supported
me.”
But I never gave it any real thought, I was just raised that way, and I believed in I guess I like to
think the core principles of where I believe the Democratic Party is, and that it’s more for the
middle-of-the-roaders and the working people, not that that’s always the case, but I just was
raised that way by a conservative Democrat.
BW: When you announced that you were not running again, were you pretty certain that Jon
Kyl would succeed you?
DD: Oh yes, I knew he was, and it would have been a very tough race, but I actually like
campaigning, and I’d already raised, I don’t know, close to eight hundred thousand dollars, and I
knew it would be probably my toughest race after my first one. And he had taken Keating
money as I had, he hadn’t gone through the same rigmarole and public hearing that I had, but he
had taken money and failed to [report it timely] – we’d already done research on him, we’d hired
a research firm for Kyl, and we already had all the stuff on Kyl, his avoiding the draft and all the
nasty things you can come up with, including Keating, and supposedly visits he had with Keating
and all that kind of stuff, so I was prepared for Kyl – I would have been prepared for Kyl.
BW:

Did you play a role in the election of ‘94?

DD: Big time. It didn’t succeed. A guy announced against me, and his family, his father Bill
Mahoney was a long time friend of my dad’s, contemporaries forever, and he’d been ambassador
for, I can’t remember where, Ghana I think, and just a great guy, he supported me when I ran,
there were other Democrats running, my first race. His son announced – first of all, his son and I
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met, and his son was a friend of mine and said he wouldn’t run if I ran, and I had some witnesses
there, staffers, but he says, “If you don’t run, I’m going to run.” So then when the Keating thing
came along, he announced he’s going to run. So I was determined I was still running then, I
said, no, I’m going to beat him but it’s going to really be not only expensive, because I’ll get hurt
in the primary, and then I’ll have to face Kyl.
So people went to him on my behalf saying, “Dick, you said you wouldn’t run, and you can’t do
this to DeConcini,” and he hemmed and hawed but he was still out there for it. So when I
announced, I made sure I had a candidate, and I had a one-term congressman who I brought over
to the Senate a couple of times, and got Kennedy to talk to him, got Mitchell to talk to him, and
he was my candidate and I worked hard for him, raised money for him, and Kyl beat him pretty
bad.
BW:

So he actually won the primary.

DD: He won the primary, and I really worked hard for him, yeah. We beat Mahoney, [but]
had he known [ ] that I wasn’t going to run, and waited, he would have been the nominee. And I
don’t know that he could have beaten Kyl, but he would have been a good candidate. He’d been
secretary of state, and he was a very liberal guy, he really [was], and he kind of wore it on his
sleeve, but he was a reformist.
BW:

And so your man beat him.

DD: My man beat him, and his [Mahoney’s] sister worked for me, which was very
embarrassing for his sister, and she was such a nice gal. And so I got her a job at ATF, when he
announced I called the director at ATF, who I’d worked very closely with, and asked him if he’d
help me. He said, “Sure, sure,” he hired her. I think she’s just retired from there.
BW:

How much did Keating have bearing on your decision not to run again?

DD: In retrospect, probably more than I realized. When the Keating thing first started, I
actually thought about just resigning. I’m no different than anybody else, I love the attention and
the glory or whatever you want to call it, and the success, but I didn’t really get into it for that
and I just was so taken aback [at] the press reaction to this, as to all of us, not just me, I just
couldn’t believe this. So after I got over that, then I had a spirit, no, yeah, I’m going to
overcome it, I’m just going to run and I’m going to show them. I know how to campaign, I
know how to raise money, and the Senate didn’t condemn us or sanction us, though it was just as
bad with twenty-three days of public hearings and bad press. So I was really quite determined to
do that.
And I had a lot of personal problems in my life, my wife and I and what have you. And I
remember so well deciding, I was sitting on the couch looking at my schedule in ‘93, the autumn
of ‘93, looking at all the fund raisers I had to go to. I had this great fund raiser, just [a] fantastic
guy, and I looked at that, and I think it was September of ‘93, I said, “I don’t want to do this.”
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And I had all the reasons to back that up, after I had talked myself into, ‘you’re going to do it and
you’re going to win.’
And when I ran for office people asked me, young people come and ask you, ‘Should I run, and
how do I prepare myself?’ I said “Well, I can only tell you what I do. Every time I run for
office, I psychologically prepare myself: can you take a defeat, can you really take it?”
Financially, the answer was ‘yes.’ But emotionally, can you [ ] really take it? I used to weigh
that very heavy every time I ran, except when I knew, I was in the Senate, I was going to beat
these guys that ran against me, I didn’t worry about that. The first time I ran, when I ran for
county attorney, and when I ran the last time, [it] really came down to that. I meditated about it,
I believe in prayer, and I asked for help. And I came to the decision, yeah, I can take it. If Kyl
beats me, I can live with that, [I had] served eighteen years, yada-yada-yada.
So when I changed my mind, what I remember – and how much Keating had to do with it, it’s
hard to say – what I remember was the challenge of raising, at that time I think my fund raiser
said I had to have three-and-a-half, four million bucks. And we’d already raised over seven
hundred, eight hundred [thousand], and we had enough fund raisers out there for two or three
million. But I just [ ] didn’t really like fund-raising, even though I was good at it, [because] I
had to turn on a different mind set. And [my fund raiser] was so good, because he’d help me
turn it on, and give me the script and who to talk to and how their kid was in college and
everything, so I was good at it but I didn’t like it. And that was a telling moment.
And so to answer your question, how much latent Keating effect was, it’s hard for me to be
objective because I don’t know. Because I think I had gotten over the disappointment and the
damage to me personally that was caused by Keating.
BW: When the Keating story broke, and through the whole process, what was the role of the
Democratic Party in terms of support or non-support, and did George Mitchell play a role?
DD: No, [he did not get involved, that I am aware of]. I went to George. Because – I’m
trying to think who told me, some Republican senator told me, I don’t think I put it in the book.
Anyway, told me that McCain had gone to Dole and asked Dole to put pressure on the committee
to get him out, to get Bennett to drop him and to get the three Republican members to press to
get McCain out. I don’t know if that’s true or not, but that’s what I was told. And so I tried to
verify that the best I could and I got a couple of people [who] said ‘yes,’ and I remember asking
Dole and he said, “Yeah, I’ve talked to John,” that’s all, and he says, “I can’t tell you anything
about it.” So I don’t know, but So, I had not talked to George Mitchell, so I went to see George and talked to him, and I wanted
him to intervene for me, and he said no, he couldn’t do it. He said, “Dennis, I don’t think you’re
going to get hurt by this, and I know you didn’t do anything wrong,” but he wouldn’t intervene,
which was probably the correct ethical thing to do [p/o].
BW:

Why was it correct and ethical for him not to -?
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DD: Well, from his perspective it was. From his perspective, because the Ethics Committee
was to sort this through, and that’s why we had an ethics committee and that’s why you had three
Republicans, three Democrats, so it was not lopsided for one side or the other, and you had a
former [state] Supreme Court judge who was the chairman of it, and this was what he believed,
and I firmly believe [in] it and I respect that. I just felt like, you’re grasping for a lot of lifelines
when you’re up there and they’re accusing you of something and you don’t think you did
anything wrong.
BW:

So any subsequent discussion of the Keating episode with him?

DD: Well yes, because afterwards there was a lot of stuff leaked during that time, and I went
to Mitchell, and people went to Dole, and they agreed that it was egregious that during that
hearing so much stuff was leaked, and the press loves that, as you know. And so they appointed
a guy, a New York lawyer, to come down and investigate that [ ] BW:

Fleming.

DD: Fleming, thank you. Boy, you have a good memory! Fleming, and I remember talking
to him at great length. And I thanked George for doing that, but his conclusion was nothing that
George could hang his hat on, or Dole.
BW:

Is there life after the Senate?

DD: Oh yeah, I talk about it all the time, it was the best job I ever had in all my life. I don’t
want anybody to ever feel sorry for me, but I never worked harder in my life, never. And I was a
workaholic, [but I] never worked harder. But I enjoyed, I wouldn’t say every minute of it, but I
enjoyed it, [there] was such a diversity [of issues]. And when I left, it took me a while to, yeah,
how do you say it, come down to earth, or get back to who you are.
I came from a father and mother that always kept your ego expectations down, they supported
you and encouraged you, but—‘don’t get carried away with yourself.’ [p/o] And it took me
more than a year before I finally realized, it’s over. And there wasn’t anything I was trying to
do, except every time I’d read the paper and every time I’d see a former constituent that would
have a complaint, I wanted to go help him. And I couldn’t do anything for him, I’d tell him how
to go do it, but I would read the paper and I’d see some egregious thing and I’d go introduce a
resolution two days later, doing something about it. Or some constituent would meet me at a
county fair, talk to my staff, within a week we’d be on top of the case. And I liked that, and
that’s what I missed because nobody calls you. They do call you, for the press, just for, but not
like when you’re in the midst of the game, so to speak. And that took over a year before I finally
let loose.
And when I came to work here, my mother said, don’t be a lobbyist, God, whatever you do,
don’t be a lobbyist. And this good friend of mine, a Republican judge that I had put on the court
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my first term, but he’s a dear friend of mine and I got a lot of heat from Democrats for putting
him on, p/o] and he said, “Dennis, you don’t want to be a lobbyist. Go start a foundation, or go
join the Foreign Relations Club and be the chairman of that in a couple of years in New York, or
go with somebody who’s not lobbying, be a teacher, be a professor.”
So I thought about that, although I had already started here, I did go teach at the University of
Arizona, and I found that to be really hard work. Really hard work. I liked it, but it was hard
work. And I actually got paid for it. And when I came here, knowing these people that I work
with, it was such a easy going place it was like a—I can’t say a vacation—but it was so nice to
go to work. There was no stress. I made appointments, I could get in to see people, I had to wait
a year, and once in a while I didn’t get what I needed but it was no stress, and then clients were
coming in, I was bringing clients in, I was starting to make really good money, I still traveled all
the time, I’ve gotten my personal life taken care of. And so, it’s just a great life after the Senate,
just a great life.
And I’ve thought back about it. Assuming you could have gotten reelected, how many more
terms would you have run. I’ve asked myself that so many times, and I say well, I would have
run one more term because I would have been sixty-six, or sixty-five or sixty-four or something
like that. But I’ve seen so many people get stuck, and I’ve found many times that, “Dennis,
think you would have become a Joe Biden or Pat Leahy or Orrin Hatch?” or people that I really
like and that I call them friends, though I don’t see much of them anymore, and just stuck in the
Senate, which is not something I would want to do. So I’m very comfortable with where I am,
because I’m having a great life and I’m making more money than I probably am worth.
BW:

Have you had any contacts with Mitchell since the Senate?

DD: I’ve seen him a couple times. I called him when Clinton, after I left the Senate, I called
him when he was majority leader, to help me to become ambassador to Italy, which he responded
very nicely. We both left the Senate, I called, he said he’d called the White House and he’d talk
to Pat [Griffin], oh gosh, the guy who was the floor leader, staff leader who worked for Mitchell,
was down there doing government relations. And Mitchell called me back, he said, “Dennis, I
think you’re going to get it,” he said, “they were very positive down there.” And I said, “Gee,
thanks George,” because I wasn’t sure he’d want to go out on that thing, but he couldn’t have
been nicer about it. He said, “Oh, you’d be a perfect ambassador to Italy, perfect, yeah, I’m glad
you called me.” And he made that call and he called me back.
And after that I called him once regarding the NFL. He was doing some investigation of the
NFL – or maybe it was the baseball, he was doing something BW:

Baseball, steroids.

DD: Yeah, baseball, he was doing something on steroids, [ ]. And Segal [sic: Selig], [ ] was
a guy I had dealt with on sports, because I [was chair of] the Patent Subcommittee and Copyright
Subcommittee and [(substantial revision:) I’d done work with the NFL and the American
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Baseball League—I don’t remember what it was, can’t remember. I think it had to do with the
Players’ Sssociation, which I had some relations with.]
BW:

Bud Selig.

DD: Selig, Bud Selig, thank you, used to own the Minneapolis Twins [sic: Milwaukee
Brewers].
BW:

I think he still does.

DD: Does he still? Yes, [he] sold it to his daughter or something like that. But anyway, and I
talked to Mitchell about the sports thing, and I don’t know if I just said how are you doing or, I
didn’t have any axe to grind, but I remember talking to him about it. I don’t know if he would
even remember. And then I’ve seen him once in a while at an event, the convention and that sort
of thing.
BW:

Do you have any inkling why you didn’t get the ambassadorship?

DD: Oh, I know exactly why, yeah. I know exactly why. There was a guy named [Thomas
M.] Foglietta, a congressman from Pennsylvania, from Philadelphia, who I knew, and Rendell
was mayor of Philadelphia, and he had a big falling out with the public employees, and this is
when he was mayor. And he wanted to, now he was getting ready to run for, he was chairman of
the Democratic Party, getting ready to run for governor, he wanted to get the seat that he could
give and have some influence to give to a[n] African American [ ], because it was an African
American district, and he pushed the White House big time. And I had a couple of confirmations
from people, finally one person who used to work for me down there confirmed it for me (she
was a staffer on my Judiciary Committee) that he went to the president and convinced him that
this would help him. And of course Foglietta got the [position]. They had a primary [in the
district], and a white guy was elected, just like Foglietta. [They] would run three or four blacks,
or two or three African Americans, to split the votes, that were friends of his. And this would
happen, that’s the first time.
BW: I was struck in the [ ] chapter in your book where you mention a lot of your colleagues,
and George Mitchell was not among them, and I was just wondering what DD: The only reason is because I think I talked about him, I know I did, about his leadership
under “Operations” so, when you write these books, and you’ve probably been involved in them,
I wanted a five-hundred- or six-hundred-page book, but the publisher and the guy that was a
historian [and coauthor who] helped verify and edited what I wrote said, “You can’t do more
than three hundred pages, that’s it.” And I would have much liked to have gone into many more
of the personalities of people, and more of the foreign travel, because I had such experiences
with Mrs. Gandhi and with her son, and with people all over the world that I had an opportunity
to meet that I didn’t get into the book. And that was the only reason George Mitchell wasn’t in
[that section], because I’d already talked about him.
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BW: I know you’ve already said this in several ways, but how do you think George Mitchell
ought to be remembered?
DD: Since his tremendous success internationally, even if he doesn’t put it together in the
Middle East, that to me is a gift that Mitchell has left all of us. Bringing peace to Northern
Ireland, as close as that country is, and the U.K., with the United States is something that will be
remembered historically. And to me, he did a lot of other wonderful things, including being a
[great] judge. I read some of his cases, when he was a judge, just out of curiosity. He was a
great writer, I thought. And my father was a judge so I had a little bit of comparison.
But what he did [in Northern Ireland] was something that I didn’t think could be done, and he
told me, I talked to him after it, that he wasn’t sure it could be done and had many misgivings,
and the books and things that I’ve read about it, it was a masterful. So if it’s any one thing, then
that would be what I would think. And I have a glimmer of hope he might do something in the
Middle East. He’s a talented, talented guy, he is just, really is a talented fellow. He’s not just
smart here, but people smart, he’s just really good.
BW:

Anything left unsaid today?

DD:

No, sir, thank you. Probably took longer than you want.

BW:

No, no, not at all, thanks very much.

DD: I’m glad, thank you for asking me, because I never was one of his close friends, but I
like the guy so much, I just admire him so much.
BW:

Thank you, Senator.

DD:

You’re welcome.

End of Interview
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